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srael and South Africa are often considered to have many characteristics in common. Both are lands of 
immigration, whose states were founded by European minorities who adopted a policy of planned 
colonization. Both were occupied by Great Britain, which saw the areas as imperial assets. Both of 
them obtained independence after the World War II and adopted a pro-American policy. The elites of both 
societies cultivated the self-image of leading, advanced Western states surrounded by hostile, primitive environs. 
Both Israel and South Africa developed domestic, state-subsidized arms industries, including joint 
projects involving the manufacture of tanks, planes, and missiles - with exchangeable parts. Both developed 
secret atomic weapons projects which frequently involved joint testing. Both adopted discriminatory policies 
against the colonized population, including not only the deprivation of civil rights but also special measures 
pertaining to the labor market – arrangements which were willingly accepted by both employers and the 
trade unions. 
Both states, since the late 1980's, have undergone a fundamental transformation in their economic 
structures and foreign relations. As we shall see, this change was impelled by the decline in profitability 
suffered by the military-industrial sector in both countries in the mid-1980's. In response, both countries 
declared their intentions to achieve regional detente and open a new page in their relations with their 
neighbors. Both of them began to dismantle their local monopolistic economic structures and opened their 
economies to the world. The process of liberalization hurt the middle strata of wage-earners: the very layers 
which, in both countries, had until then been considered the hard core of the regnant racist consensus. In 
both countries, formerly demonized enemies, such as Mandela and Arafat, became desired guests, along 
with transnational corporations and foreign investors.  
Decline of Corporate Profits in 
Israel in the 1980's 
A brief graphic illustration helps depict the process 
which both economies had been undergoing — a 
process which may be summarized as a differential 
decline suffered by the monopolistic-military 
sector; that is, a decline in the profitability of this 
once leading sector (in both countries) in relation 
to other sectors of the economy. This led, in both 
countries, to a decision to attempt a shift from a 
monopolistic war economy to an open peace 
economy - and this structural economic change 
had, of course, to be accompanied by concomitant 
changes in political policy: in both countries, the 
political reconciliation with former enemies - once 
nearly unthinkable - reflected the need to liberalize 
and. to a degree, 'demilitarize' their economies. 
Figures 1 and 2 chart data pertaining to the 
return to capital in Israel. Figure 1 depicts the 
share of Gross and Net Capital Income as a share 
of total Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as well as 
Gross return on capital.1 Figure 1 illuminates the 
marked deterioration in the position of capital 
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during much of the 1980's. The share of gross 
capital income in GDP fell from nearly 18 percent 
in 1981 to less than six percent in 1987.2 Figure 2 
illustrates the contrast between the behavior of 
overall capital income with that of the profits of 
Israel's five largest conglomerates.3 
Beyond the cyclical similarities of the two ratios - 
that of overall capital income and that of the five 
largest conglomerates - there are also some 
interesting differences. The data for All Capital 
Income include, in addition to the profits of the five 
largest conglomerates, those of smaller firms, as 
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well as interest payments. As a result, differences 
in the relative magnitude of the two series denote a 
process of redistribution between the different 
components of the business sector (the large 
conglomerate relative to the rest of the corporate 
sector and the rentiers). Figure 2 illustrates the 
spectacular growth of the conglomerate group 
which began in the mid-1970's and reached its 
peak in 1984, during the stagflation era of 
military spending.4 
However, following this rapid differential 
accumulation by the large conglomerates came 
an equally rapid differential decline. Since 1984, 
the net profits of the large conglomerates fell 
much more rapidly than those of the business 
sector as a whole. The reasons were more or less 
symmetrical to those which brought their earlier 
rise and included the winding down of the intense 
phase of the War in Lebanon and the after-effects 
of the Tel Aviv stock market crisis at the end of 
1983.5 
Moreover, military purchases were curtailed 
both in real terms as well as a share of GDP while 
military exports, since the mid-1990's have 













conglomerates faced threats to their continued 
existence, and Koor was close to bankruptcy. By 
1988, their combined net profits fell below 0.5 
percent of GDP, down from close to 14 percent only 
four years earlier. These data serve to explain, at 
least in part, the fundamental change of heart lying 
behind the shift from a monopolistic war economy 
toward an open peace economy. If a move to a 
peace economy was perceived by the monopolistic 
conglomerates as necessary medicine for their ills, 
the peace process became a perquisite for the 
administration of the therapy. 
 
The Response: Perestroika 
Israeli-Style - Economic and 
Political Restructuring 
During the mid-1980's, it must have dawned on 
the owners and managers of the large 
conglomerates that the era of monopolistic 
militarism had come to an end and that if they were 
to survive they had to embark on an entirely new 
path, and quickly. They also had to explain their 
new set of needs to the politicians and expected 
them to respond appropriately, with more liberal 
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policies in both the economic and foreign relations 
fields. 
The record since 1989 would seem to indicate 
that the expectations on the part of the Israeli elite 
are being met. Capital income has recovered 
significantly, due to very rapid growth as well as 
to falling real wages in the wake of more open 
markets. Russian immigration and the dismantling 
of labor organizations in Israel. The recovery of the 
big conglomerates was more moderate however, 
partly because they are now operating in a more 
open environment of global competition, and also 
because of the rapid growth of the small economy, 
particularly in the high-tech sector. Nevertheless, it 
is the big corporations which will probably 
benefit the most from the peace process, given their 
greater ability to move abroad and to enter 
neighboring Middle East markets. 
 
The Case of South Africa: 
Similar Disease, Similar 
Medicine 
The structural economic situation of South Africa 
was in many ways similar to that of Israel. A large 
oligopolistic high-tech sector under government 
protection coexisted with a labor-intensive, low-
technology economy based on cheap Black labor 
(just as large parts of Israel's economy came to rely 
on cheap Palestinian labor). Chart 3 shows that, 
beginning in the 1970"s. South Africa - much like 
Israel - suffered from stagflation (negative 
correlation between growth and inflation), which is 
what one would expect from a closed war 
economy with tight monopolistic arrangements. 
Figure 4 provides data on the evolution of net 
corporate profit after taxes, both in real terms as 
well as a share of GDP between 1960 and 1993.6 
The data show a significant change occurring in 
1980. Until that period, corporate profits were 
rising in real terms while maintaining their share 
in GDP around an average of 17 percent (and even 
growing to over 25 percent in the late 1970's). 
In the 1980's, however, net profits began to 
plummet rapidly, falling from 26.6 percent of GDP in 
1980 to 8.5 percent in 1992 – reflecting a real 
decline of 63 percent. The large South African 
corporations were always ambivalent about 
Apartheid – although it was their industrialization 
of South Africa which impoverished the 
Afrikaners and generated the Afrikaner backlash 
which led to the imposition of Apartheid by the 
Nationalist government in the late 1940's. On the 
one hand, these companies enjoyed cheap Black 
labor; but on the other, the poverty of the Black 
majority exacerbated South Africa's chronic 
stagnation (real GDP per capita began dropping 
since the early 1980's), and by leading to the 
intensification of the armed struggle, also brought 
international sanctions. However, until 1980, there 
was no compelling reason to act. Profits 
maintained their previous share of the GDP, or 
even grew relative to the national economy, and 
they rose considerably in real terms. Hence, it was 
only in the early 1990's that the large, 
predominantly "Anglo" conglomerates began to 
move more openly against the racist regime in 
Pretoria, which at that time was willing to accept 
the increasing isolation of the country, as the price 
for retaining power. The "New South Africa" was 
born through a corporatist pact between the ANC 
and big business. Mandela gave up all earlier 
socialist rhetoric and plans for nationalization in 
return for the solid support of Anglo-American and 
other conglomerates. Profits started to recover in 
1993 and South Africa is now seen by many as the 
future technological and financial center for the 
sub-Saharan countries, and a promised outlet for 





In conclusion, declining differential accumulation 
throughout the 1980's on the part of the 
monopolistic, military- and industry-concentrated 
conglomerates, historically the mainstays of the 
economies in both South Africa and Israel, forced 
structural economic - and, as a consequence, 
political - changes in both countries. Whether these 
will ultimately prove viable, only time will tell. ■ 
Endnotes 
1 Gross Capital Income denotes the sum of corporate profit (from 
both domestic and foreign sources) and interest accruing to 
individuals (rent and income of incorporated business are 
excluded). Net Capital Income is given by Gross Capital Income 
less corporate taxes. Both measurements are expressed as a share 
of GDP. Gross return on capital is computed as a ratio of 
Operating Surplus corporate profit, interest and rent to the 
outstanding capital stock. 
See the National Accounts 1993, Preliminary Estimates, 
Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, table 17, p. 40. 
2 The problem was further aggravated by the effect on taxes of 
fluctuating rates of inflation. During the early 1980's, rising 
inflation reduced corporate profits from about 3 percent of GDP in 
1980 (when the consumer price index indicated 131 percent 
inflation ), to about 0.5 percent in 1984 (when CPI inflation 
reached 444 percent). The decline in inflation since then has had the 
opposite effect and corporate taxes have risen to over 2.5 
percent of GDP by 1987 - but, this time the pain was much larger 
than during the earlier period since, in relations to GDP, Gross 
Capital Income was now 2/3 lower than it was in 1981. The years of 
1988 and 1989 were difficult years for capital with gross 
capital income hovering around 6 percent of GDP. The picture 
for net income was somewhat better as the government moved to 
alleviate the tax burden: after tax income rose to about 3.5 
percent of GDP; the big boost, however, arrived only in 1990, 
first with the massive immigration from the former Soviet Union 
and then, with the 'animal spirits' of the peace process pushing 
up investment and pulling the Israeli economy from its protracted 
recession. Gross Capital Income rose from 6 percent to 10 percent of 
GDP, while Net Capital Income, assisted by further reduction in 
taxes, climbed from 3.5 percent of GDP to over 8 percent of 
GDP in 1992. The process is mirrored in the series of gross return on 
capital with the ratio falling from over 12 percent in 1982 to 4.5 
percent in 1988 and then recovering rapidly to its early 1980's levels. 
The reason why this index rose proportionately more than the 
previous two is that the capital stock was growing less rapidly than 
national income. This is to be expected given that the growth of NET 
investment in Israel has until recently lagged significantly behind the 
growth of GDP. 
3 The data for all capital income denote the sum of interest 
payments to individuals plus corporate profits less taxes. The 
figures for the 5 largest conglomerates give the aggregate after 
tax profit of the Leumi group, Hapoalim group, IDB group, Koor 
and Clal-Israel. Both series are expressed as a share of GDP. 
4 With the decline of the mixed economy since the early 1970's 
and the coming to power of the Likud in 1977, the five 
conglomerates began to appropriate a rapidly growing share not 
only of the GDP, but also of the net capital income. Thus, the 
net profits of these conglomerates rose from about 1 percent of 
GDP, during the early 1970's, to a stunning 14 percent by 1984, 
which was more than the overall net income from capital!! Part 
of this development is probably rooted in the inaccuracies of 
reported profits during the hyperinflation of the 1980 's (although 
the GDP accounts in that period were not that accurate either. In 
spite of some inexactitude in the data, it is clear that the process 
of redistribution was a real one. During that period, the small 
economy was squeezed by skyrocketing interest rates and 
massive losses from severely restricted effective demand. For the 
big economy, however, higher interest rates meant larger, not 
lower, profits. During the mid 1980's, real lending rates were 
over 40 percent, while real deposit rates were less than 10 percent, 
leaving a 30 percent real margin for the large lenders. 
Furthermore, rising military spending until the mid 1980's was 
disproportionately beneficial for the large industrial 
conglomerates. 
5 Further, lower inflation meant declining real interest margins 
(the differential rate of interests on loans and deposits), for the 
large banks' real margins (taking account of the CPI and other 
indices) dropped to less 10 percent in the late 1980 's and further to 
a thin 5 percent by the early 1990's). 
 
